Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
267 SCRA 402
February 1997 En Banc
FACTS:

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the former’s bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s check.

One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
224 SCRA 782
July 1993
FACTS:

Plaintiffs, who are minors represented by their parents, alleged that the then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.’s continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country will work great damage and injury to the plaintiffs and their successors. Defendant, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the plaintiffs failed to state a specific right violated by the defendant and that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question and cannot be tried in the Courts. The RTC of Makati, Branch 66, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case at bar subject to the judicial power of the Court

COURT RULING:

Being impressed with merit, the Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the Order of the RTC which dismissed the case.

The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

Although concurring in the result, Justice Feliciano penned his separate opinions on a number of topics pointed by Justice Davide, Jr. in this Court decision. Justice Feliciano said that the concept of the word “class” is too broad to cover the plaintiffs and their representatives alone, and that the Court may be deemed recognizing anyone’s right to file action as against both the public administrative agency and the private entities of the sector involved in the case at bar, to wit:

“Neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provisions of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.”

Justice Feliciano further stated that the Court in the case at bar in effect made Sections 15 and 16 of Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution to be self-executing and judicially enforceable even in its present form, and that these implications are too large and far reaching in nature ever to be hinted in this instant case.

Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)

Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288
November 1990
FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products “naphta cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors without considering the national interest

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.

Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

Marbury vs. Madison

Marbury vs. Madison
5 US (Cranch) 137
February 1803
FACTS:

Petitioner William Marbury was appointed Justice of the Peace for the county if Washington in the District of Columbia by then President John Adams of the US shortly before the latter vacated his Office. However, Adams' Secretary of State, John Marshall, failed to deliver to Marbury the latter's duly signed and sealed commission documents, without which the petitioner cannot undertake his office as Justice of the Peace.

When Thomas Jefferson assumed presidency, his new Secretary of State, herein respondent James Madison, continued to withhold the said commission document from Marbury. Hence, this petition for mandamus was filed to the US Supreme Court to compel Madison to deliver the commission document top Marbury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the same Court has jurisdiction to issue the mandamus, given the circumstances of the case

COURT RULING:

The US Supreme Court, through the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, denied Marbury's petition for mandamus on the argument that the said Court has no jurisdiction on the case, and that the law on which Marbury based the said petition is unconstitutional.

As a general rule, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, and shall have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. In the case at bar, the Court made it clear that Marbury had already attained the five year legal right ti the commission because of the fact that the commission document has been completed the moment it was officially sealed, obliterating any doubt as to the authenticity of the signature affixed by the US President himself. However, Marbury failed to show that the mandamus he prays for is an exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction, which led to the denial of his petition.

"It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it reviews and corrects the proceedings in a case already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed ot courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer to deliver a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original jurisdiction, Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction"

Another general rule is that any law repugnant to the Constitution is void. The Courts, as well as other departments, are bound by the instrument, as repeatedly emphasized by Chief Justice Marshall. He further reiterated that the written Constitution should be upheld and protected at all times, and that the Court has a duty to ensure that such reverence is given to the written Constitution. It must remain above all laws.

The power of the legislative department to create laws cannot ever exceed the written Constitution which itself is the source of such power. The power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that Court in other cases; provided those cases belong to the jurisdictional power of the US. As to the power of the President over the officer whom he appoints, it is limited by the written Constitution and is deemed completed the moment he affixed his signature unto the commission document and "to withhold the commission x x x is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law but violative of a vested right."

The action for mandamus in this case filed by the petitioner is in excess of the Court's jurisdiction, and any law enacted by the legislature which diminish or increase the Court's jurisdiction without the Court's prior consent is unconstitutional and must be discharged.